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We propose a novel account for the emergence of human language syntax. Like many
evolutionary innovations, language arose from the adventitious combination of two pre-
existing, simpler systems that had been evolved for other functional tasks.The first system,
Type E(xpression), is found in birdsong, where the same song marks territory, mating avail-
ability, and similar “expressive” functions. The second system, Type L(exical), has been
suggestively found in non-human primate calls and in honeybee waggle dances, where it
demarcates predicates with one or more “arguments,” such as combinations of calls in
monkeys or compass headings set to sun position in honeybees. We show that human
language syntax is composed of two layers that parallel these two independently evolved
systems: an “E” layer resembling theType E system of birdsong and an “L” layer providing
words. The existence of the “E” and “L” layers can be confirmed using standard linguistic
methodology. Each layer, E and L, when considered separately, is characterizable as a finite
state system, as observed in several non-human species. When the two systems are put
together they interact, yielding the unbounded, non-finite state, hierarchical structure that
serves as the hallmark of full-fledged human language syntax. In this way, we account for
the appearance of a novel function, language, within a conventional Darwinian framework,
along with its apparently unique emergence in a single species.
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INTRODUCTION
Human language appears to be a recent evolutionary develop-
ment, arising within the past 100,000 years, and has not evolved in
any significant way since our ancestors left Africa, about 50,000–
80,000 years ago (Tattersall, 2009). If so, the human language
faculty emerged relatively suddenly in evolutionary time and has
not evolved since.
How did this come about? While speculation about evolution
without direct data remains challenging, it may still be possible
to provide an account broadly compatible with what we know
about human language syntax, along with the apparently rapid
emergence of language. Contemporary human language syntax
cannot be characterized by any finite state grammar (Chomsky,
1956). Such simple systems cannot properly represent the ambi-
guity found in human language, even for the simplest word strings
such as deep blue sky. Finite state systems cannot represent such
ambiguity because by definition they are syntactic monoids: alge-
braically, they must obey associativity, so they cannot assign two
distinct representations to the concatenation deep blue sky. One
needs a compositional operator that can take two lexical items,
or in general any two syntactic objects, and assemble them into a
single, newly labeled whole, beyond the power of any finite state
grammar.
In this paper we advance a novel account for the emergence
of this species-specific language property. Like many evolutionary
innovations, we propose that language arose from the adventi-
tious combination of two pre-existing, simpler systems evolved
for other tasks. The first system, which we will call Type E, for
expressive, can be found, for example, in birdsong (Berwick et al.,
2011), where the same song serves to mark territory, mating avail-
ability, and other“expressive” functions. The second system, which
we will call Type L, for lexical, has been suggestively observed in
honeybees, where it demarcate a predicate with one or more“argu-
ments” – here, elements of the honeybees’ dance corresponding
to compass headings and flight paths (Riley et al., 2005). Some-
what controversial examples of Type L are monkey alarm calls
that referentially convey types of predators (Seyfarth et al., 1980)
and show combinatorial emergence of new semantics (Arnold and
Zuberbuhler, 2006). Human language syntax integrates these two
systems into single, composite, hierarchically structured whole
by linking elements from the Lexical system with those of the
Expressive system.
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE SHOWS HOW TO LINK THE E AND L
SYSTEMS
A simple question such as (1) illustrates how the Expressive and
Lexical systems are linked.
(1) What i do you think that Mary said John bought ___i?
The phrase what occurs at the head of a sentence in an expressive
“question position” but it is also semantically associated as a verbal
argument in a lexical position after buy where it is given mean-
ingful, interpretable content. The next section demonstrates that
all such “linking relations” bridge the lexical and expressive layers,
integrating the two systems.
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HUMAN LANGUAGE SENTENCES CONTAIN TWO LAYERS OF
MEANING
All human language sentences are composed of two meaning layers
(e.g., Chomsky, 1995; Miyagawa, 2010). Consider (2).
(2) Did John eat pasta?
The core lexical meaning of (2) is formed from the words, John,
eat, and pasta. Regardless of syntactic form, the lexical meaning
fixed by these words remains intact: e.g., one can add modality or
tense, as in, John may eat pasta; John will eat pasta. Separate from
the lexical structure, sentence (2) contains the word did, which
has two functions. The first expresses tense (John did eat pasta);
the second expresses a question (did John eat pasta?). In this way,
starting with lexical structure,Tense, and Question-formation
output an expression that can be used in conversation. Did indi-
cates a past event, and it forms a question about this event. This
so-called “duality of semantics” (Chomsky, 2000) is represented as
a hierarchical structure (Hale and Keyser, 1993; Chomsky, 2005;
Miyagawa, 2010).
(3) Duality of semantics (Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Miyagawa, 2010)
Expression 
Structure
Question
Tense Lexical 
Structure
John eat pizza
lexical structure is composed from a potentially open-ended
set of lexical items that occur independently (John, eat, pasta). In
contrast, expression structure is composed of limited num-
ber of elements typically characterized as “functional elements”
that lack independent status, e.g., the past tense – ed in English
(e.g., Hale and Keyser, 1993). As shown in (3), sentences are con-
structed with an “outer layer” of expression structure and an
“inner layer” of lexical structure.
ANTECEDENTS FOR LEXICAL STRUCTURE IN NON-HUMAN
ANIMALS
To make the case for an evolutionary precursor for lexical struc-
ture, one should locate in another animal species the ability to
group two or three elements together, without syntax, arriving at
an amalgamated “meaning.” In the honeybee waggle dance, the
dance meaning may be decomposed into two parts, without syn-
tax: dance direction conveys compass bearing for food location;
dance speed conveys information regarding distance to a food
source (Riley et al., 2005).
There is a large body of literature on the calls of monkeys
and apes (Seed and Tomasello, 2010). Earlier studies concluded
that Kenyan Vervet monkeys (Seyfarth et al., 1980) possess alarm
calls for pythons, eagles, and leopards. In a sense, this is the sim-
plest lexically based system where an uttered object correlates with
a particular real-world state of affairs. More recently, there has
been much debate as to whether non-human primates possess
the ability to construe objects within an abstract event (Tomasello
and Call, 1997). These studies suggest that non-human primate
calls may be construed as lexical. For example, a number of stud-
ies have suggested that these primates perform reasonably well
on Piagetian object permanence up to State 4 or 5 (Seed and
Tomasello, 2010); they perceive objects even when they are no
longer in their original location. There are even some recent
studies in various primate species suggesting that these animals
might use multiple calls to compose a novel meaning (Dessalles,
2007; Arnold and Zuberbuhler, 2008; Tallerman and Gibson,
2011).
BIRDSONG AND EXPRESSION STRUCTURE
Links between birdsong and human language have long been
noted (Darwin, 1871; Jespersen, 1922; Marler, 1970; Notte-
bohm, 1975; Doupe and Kuhl, 1999; Okanoya, 2002; Bolhuis
et al., 2010; Berwick et al., 2012). There are striking paral-
lels between birdsong and human language acquisition: a need
for external input; sensitive developmental periods ending at
sexual maturity; hemispheric lateralization; and motor-auditory
rehearsal systems (Bolhuis et al., 2010). Despite these similari-
ties, what is striking about every variety of birdsong that has
been studied is that lexical items in the sense of human lan-
guages remain absent (Berwick et al., 2011). Nor does birdsong
contain the rich hierarchical structure characteristic of human
language (Berwick et al., 2012). A typical case in point is the
song of the zebra finch (Figure 1), which has a restricted set of
“notes” that combine to form sequence of syllables, syllables into
motifs, and motifs into complete song “bouts” (Berwick et al.,
2011).
Other vocal learning bird species such as the Bengalese finch
admit more complex patterns involving branches, loops, and
repetitions.
As shown in Figure 2, Bengalese finch song can loop to a
preceding song position at various states, admitting considerable
variation. Nightingales have an even more complex song structure,
with possible branches at many more additional positions, with a
single nightingale’s repertoire containing 100–200 distinct songs
(Kipper et al., 2006). Nevertheless, all known birdsong examples
can be described as a particular constrained kind of finite state
automaton (Berwick et al., 2011).
There are two senses in which birdsongs lack lexical items, or
“words.” First, song elements are never combined to yield new
“meanings.” This is unlike primate calls mentioned above (Arnold
and Zuberbuhler, 2008). Second, regardless of variety, birdsong
conveys only a limited, holistic range of intentions, primarily
related with reproduction. In this sense, birdsongs convey mes-
sages, not meanings (Tallerman and Gibson, 2011). We will refer
to this type of language system as Type E, for E(xpression), without
meaning.
BIRDSONG AND HUMAN LANGUAGE
Two items that Berwick et al. (2012) point out that human
language has but birdsong does not are: (i) phrases “labeled”
by element features (see below); (ii) hierarchical structure of
phrases. These distinctions arise from the fact that human
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FIGURE 1 | Zebra finch song.
FIGURE 2 | Bengalese finch song.
language possesses lexical items while birdsong does not.
Thus, birdsong syntax is sometimes referred to as phono-
logical syntax, emphasizing the lack of a lexicon (Marler,
2000).
Additionally, birdsong apparently lacks any “recursion,” in the
sense that one bout can be hierarchically contained within another.
We argue that just such a limitation is also imposed on human
language, but only in the domain of expression structure,
thereby drawing one key connection between birdsong and human
language. Hence, the connection between birdsong and human
language is not between song and language in its entirety; rather,
the connection is between birdsong and the expression struc-
ture component of human language syntax. While it has been
sometimes suggested that certain bird species can acquire recursive
syntactic structures either through conditioning (Gentner et al.,
2006) or spontaneously (Abe and Watanabe, 2011), this result
remains controversial and, as noted in Beckers et al. (2012), so far
unconfirmed. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that some abilities
for processing temporally ordered acoustic streams are shared by
both avian and human vocal learners. By necessity, sound streams
must be parsed into beginning and ending “chunks” – words and
word components in the case of humans, or syllable chunks for
songbirds. Without word boundaries and word pattern recog-
nition, human language acquisition becomes impossible; this is
clearly required for early vocal learning. The same holds for birds
and syllable chunks (Takahasi et al., 2010).
(4) Human language and the non-human language-like types
LEXICAL STRUCTURE ↔ [BEES/PRIMATES] TYPE L
EXPRESSION STRUCTURE ↔ [BIRDSONG] TYPE E
LABELING
A second unique feature of human language is “labeling” (Chom-
sky, 1995). Given a word, its category (Noun, Verb, etc.) forms the
label of the larger phrase that contains it. For instance, given the
pair eat and the apples, the verb eat labels the larger phrase, eat the
apples (conventionally, a Verb Phrase).
(5) Labeling
V
V
In this way, phrases in human language have the same property as
the original lexical item that provided the label (Chomsky, 1995,
2008; Hornstein, 2009). This gives human language its unique
ability to form hierarchical structures (Chomsky, 1995, 2008;
Hornstein, 2009), as we now detail.
EXPRESSION STRUCTURE: LIMITED HIERARCHY AND LABELING
The labeling phenomenon above appears to be uniquely human.
It occurs with all kinds of phrases (e.g., Noun, Verb, Preposition)
such that human syntactic structure has the property of “discrete
infinity” (Chomsky, 2000) through recursively merging and label-
ing structures. However, on close examination, there is a severe
limitation on the depth of the hierarchy for one component of
human language. Recall that expression structure can contain
an item with property Tense; there is a second item, convention-
ally labeled “C(omplementizer)” that hosts a range of expressive
phrases such as Q(uestion), F(ocus) (e.g., Starlings, I like), and so
forth, as shown in (6).
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(6) Expression Structure
CP
C TP
|
Question
Focus T
These are the two most frequently cited“labels”within the expres-
sion structure. Strikingly, these labels cannot be assembled
as hierarchical structures of arbitrary depth. Rather, the CP-TP
hierarchical structure can be only one layer deep, as in (6). Pre-
dictably, one does not find human language hierarchical structures
such as the following (the asterisk marks an impossible form).
Such unattested structures would correspond to having succes-
sive layers of Question or Focus phrases, for example (Arseni-
jevic and Hinzen (2012) make a similar observation based on
meaning).
(7) An impossible syntactic structure
*         CP
C TP
T CP
C TP
This is similar to the restriction noted earlier for birdsong: here
we also find a depth-one hierarchical structure, as with the Ben-
galese finch and Nightingale songs. This suggests that expression
structure itself is of Type E, closely reflecting birdsong struc-
ture. Importantly then, there is no recursion through the CP-TP
expression structure. There are theories of ES (Rizzi, 1997)
that posit a multi-layer within Expression Structure to deal with
such phenomena as topicalization and focus. However, there are
alternatives that do not assume such a multi-layer (e.g., Miyagawa,
2010). Phenomena such as prosody map onto these hierarchical
structures.
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
Unlike expression structure, lexical structure elements
cannot directly combine with each other to form purely LS
hierarchical structures:
(8) Examples of impossible lexical structures
(a) * NP (b) *   NP (c) *   VP
N NP N AP V VP
| | |
John book book long want eat pizza
To make (8a) possible, for example, one must insert s (John’S
book); this s is D(eterminer; Abney, 1987), a member of the
expression structure (see below). The fact that L does not allow
hierarchy matches the constraints on type l languages found in
non-human primates and bees.
THE SOURCE OF DISCRETE INFINITY
If ES only admits one layer of hierarchical structure and LS does
not admit any hierarchical structure, what is the source of human
syntax’s unbounded hierarchical structure? The answer lies in the
way unbounded hierarchical structures are assembled, typically
combinations that interweave the E and L levels:
(9) E/L hierarchical structure (“D(eterminer)” is part of the ES
for noun phrases)
VP L
V DP E
|
read D NP L
|
the N CP E
|
book that Mary wrote
In this fragment of a sentence, we see an alternation of L and E
structure. One can abbreviate this in the form of conventional
context-free re-write rule as follows, where EP is the “label” for
a category of the type E and “LP” is the “label” for an L-type
structure.
(10) (i) EP → E LP
(ii) LP → L EP
Rule (i) states that the E category can combine with LP to form an
E-level structure. Rule (ii) states that the L category can combine
with an E-level structure to form an L-level structure. Together,
these two rules suffice to yield arbitrarily deep hierarchical struc-
tures. If we expand the left-hand side of Rule (i), EP, we obtain the
two items on the right-hand side of the rule, E LP. We may enclose
these with square brackets, to indicate that they form a complete
EP phrase [E LP]. Now we can apply Rule (ii) to LP, expanding it as,
L EP. Again using bracket notation, we obtain the form [E [L EP]].
We can once more apply Rule (i) to the EP unit that is now embed-
ded within the brackets, obtaining [E [L [E LP]]], and continue
this ad infinitum to yield arbitrarily nested hierarchical structure.
All current empirically adequate linguistic theories contain some
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means like this to build such kinds of structures. Arbitrarily deep
hierarchical structure is thus the by-product of E- and L-structures
combining alternately. Each component by itself is describable
by a finite state grammar. However, when combined, they inter-
act to yield the familiar arbitrarily deep hierarchical structure we
associate with human language.
(11) ES: finite state
LS: finite state
E/L INTEGRATION HYPOTHESIS
Given the difference between expression structure and lexical
structure, we propose that human language arose by integrat-
ing these two distinct systems, type l (lexical) and type e
(expression):
(12) Integration of E and L
How does this integration work? Two properties found in human
languages that have been the focus of intensive study in linguis-
tics, displacement and agreement, have in common the property
that they link an item from one layer with an item from the other
layer (Miyagawa, 2010), thereby uniting the two layers. We discuss
displacement below.
FROM LEXICAL STRUCTURE TO EXPRESSION STRUCTURE
The displacement of labeled phrases always occurs from lexi-
cal structure to expression structure. In forming English
questions, some question word that first occurs in the lexical
structure is displaced to the C position in the expression
structure.
(13) What did you eat ___ ?
In Chinese, to indicate the topic of a sentence, a similar displace-
ment occurs
(14) Zheben shu Zhangsan mai-le ___.
this book Zhangsna buy-ASPECT
‘This book, Zhangsan bought.’
We can picture this displacement as follows:
(15) Displacement from L to E
By displacing an item from the lexical structure to the expres-
sion structure, these two layers of language are then linked. We
therefore posit the following principle (16).
(16) Displacement exists to integrate the Expression and Lexical
structures of human language.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE INQUIRY
Our proposal partitions language syntax into two systems, E and L,
locating suggestive antecedents for each in non-human animals.
We have outlined how these two systems could be integrated to
yield the discrete infinity of human language. How did the E and L
systems come to be linked in modern humans? While answers
to this question must necessarily remain speculative, one can
advance at least two possible routes. One involves shared human
intentionality (Tomasello et al., 2005). Although there is limited
evidence that alarm calls in monkeys are under intentional con-
trol (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2010), this ability appears full-blown
in humans. Shared intentionality adds an expressive component
to the lexical system, in this way functionally interleaving the E
and L systems. A second possibility is the one noted by Darwin
(1871) in his Descent of Man: human language first emerged as
“songs” – prosodic contours and syllable structures like birdsong –
which were then grafted onto a separate word system. In this article
we have attempted to advance Darwin’s hypothesis. (Others have
embraced Darwin’s proposal, though without our division into E
and L systems; see, e.g., Fitch (2010).) Additionally, the ability to
“chunk” acoustic streams into linear segments, along with prosody
or metrical structure – the pattern of strong and light “beats” in
a song – rhythmic entrainment, and vocal learning, are shared
among vocal learning avian species as well as humans. While neu-
robiology points to right-brained localization for human prosodic
processing, it is well known that syntactic processing is localized
to left-brain areas in humans, while “naming” involves both dorsal
and ventral streams (Friederici, 2012). Taken together, one might
speculate, following Berwick (2011), that the purely finite system
for metrical structure – a right-brain activity – was joined with the
“naming” ability of early humans (or possibly other primates) to
yield the combination E-L system and so fully human language.
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